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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the project is to conduct unbiased research to determine the 
optimal type and quantity of next generation logistics ships (NGLS) based on a notional 
scenario and demand requirements for ammunition and supplies. In recent decades, the 
United States Navy has proceeded unfettered by conventional threats or serious rivalry 
from near-peer competitors. Guidance from both the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) has driven the Department of Navy (DON) 
to pursue Great Power Competition and to recalculate the advantages and disadvantages 
our military force has over our adversaries. This increase in demand for innovation and 
capability advantage supplied new concepts such as distributed maritime operations 
(DMO), littoral operations in contested environments (LOCE), and expeditionary 
advanced base operations (EABO). These concepts changed how the U.S. Navy would 
employ and distribute its forces across contested environments. The Strategic Mobility 
and Combat Logistics Division’s (N42) staff asked a complex question: how can the 
Navy logistically support and sustain these distributed forces without unnecessarily 
risking the combat logistics force (CLF) ships vital to the long-term sustainment of the 
fleet? We offer a framework using a transshipment mathematical model to rearm and 
resupply future logistics requirements in support of LOCE, DMO, and EABO. 
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For the last 30 years, the United States has been uncontested across all domains and 
has largely been able to employ its military forces where and when they were needed. The 
United States 2018 National Defense Strategy, however, assumes every domain will now 
be contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Design for Maritime Superiority points out that it has been “decades since we last competed 
for sea control, sea lines of communication, access to world markets, and diplomatic 
partnerships” (Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], 2018, p. 3). The current security 
environment will force the Navy to conduct distributed operations over a larger geographic 
area of responsibility. With units operating at extended distances in contested 
environments, their lifeline of sustainment becomes one of the top priorities. Specifically 
looking at the Indo-Pacific region of the world, the United States’ potential adversaries’ 
long-range precision fires and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capacities present 
significant concern to the U.S. lines of communication. This project will help strengthen 
naval power at and from the sea by informing the seventh line of effort identified in the 
CNO’s Design for Maritime Superiority: “posture logistics capability ashore and at sea in 
ways that allow the fleet to operate globally, at a pace that can be sustained over time,” and 
“assess and develop options for improved ability and resilience to refuel, rearm, resupply, 
and repair” (CNO, 2018, p. 8).  
In March 2020, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), General Berger, 
released the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC) Force Design 2030. This document 
made a few points that specifically help frame the problem addressed in this project. A key 
point in the document is that the Marine Corps is actively pursuing ways to effectively 
operate in an adversary’s weapon engagement zone (WEZ) to create a competitive 
advantage. Thus, “Logistics (sustainability) is both a critical requirement and a critical 
vulnerability. Forces that cannot sustain themselves inside the WEZ are liabilities; 
however, those that can sustain themselves while executing reconnaissance and counter-
reconnaissance missions create a competitive advantage” (Berger, 2020, pp. 5–6). The 
CMC did not believe that the Phase I and II planning efforts gave sufficient attention to the 
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logistics needed to execute distributed maritime operations (DMO), littoral operations in 
contested environments (LOCE), and expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) “in 
contested littoral environments against our pacing threat” (Berger, 2020). If sustainment of 
naval forces in the current security environment is not given appropriate attention, the 
force’s effectiveness will significantly diminish.  
A. HISTORY OF U.S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN CONTESTED 
ENVIRONMENTS 
As new concepts such as DMO, LOCE, and EABO are introduced, we can still 
learn considerably from the history of naval operations in contested environments. While 
technologies have changed significantly, the fundamentals and characteristics that led to 
success are still relevant today. Modern day logisticians can learn greatly from the 
sustainment success and failures that occurred during the Battle of Guadalcanal in World 
War II. This was an environment where the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps were conducting 
amphibious operations in a contested environment. In the early days at Guadalcanal, 
reactionary logistics provided the U.S. Marine Corps a chance to reinforce its reputation 
for doing more with less. Speed and mobility are critical when operating in an environment 
where sea and air control are contested. Logistics assets that are fast enough to dash in and 
dash out, large enough to carry a useful load, and small and agile enough to disperse 
supplies are critical in the early stages of a contested landing, particularly if they are 
sufficiently self-contained to execute their own landing and stevedoring (Schuck, 2019). 
Schuck (2019) attributed the Navy’s ultimate success in Guadalcanal to their ability to 
respond faster than the Japanese and the United States’ superior capabilities. While the 
U.S. forces got away with their lack of sustainment planning in Guadalcanal, sustainment 
of this reactionary posture in the current security environment and in the presence of long-
range precision weapons will meet with catastrophic consequences.  
Looking at the future operating concepts, the CNO has established a Next 
Generation Logistics Ship (NGLS) Task Force (Eckstein, 2020). The task force will 
analyze the medium platform ships for logistic missions to complement the current Combat 
Logistic Force (CLF). These medium platforms will predominately support surface action 
groups (SAGs) and expeditionary advance bases. NGLS will support refuel, rearm, and 
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resupply of naval assets in support of DMO, LOCE, and EABO concepts both inside and 
out of the WEZ. The Department of the Navy is currently seeking commercial ship designs 
that can be customized for military requirements. The department is considering platform 
supply vessels, fast supply vessels, light amphibious warships, and other offshore support 
vessels (OSVs). 
B. NAVAL SUSTAINMENT
For the U.S. Navy to be effective over extended periods at sea, replenishment at sea
(RAS) is critical. Since World War II, the modern-day Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
has fulfilled this role. The Navy’s CLF operates various ships to provide logistic support 
to deployed U.S. Naval combatants and coalition forces ships. The CLF is foundational to 
extending the U.S. Navy’s culmination point afloat by resupplying bulk fuel, ordnance, 
food, repair parts, and other various classes of supply. Without the CLF, maritime 
sustainment would rely on friendly ports, thus limiting their power projection (Wakim, 
2019). The CLF is currently made up of 29 auxiliary ships that are operated by U.S. 
Government Civil Service Merchants. The CLF is comprised of three different types of 
ships: fleet replenishment oilers (T-AO; Figure 1), dry cargo and ammunition Ships (T-
AKE; Figure 2), and fast combat support ships (T-AOE; Figure 3).  
Figure 1. USNS Patuxent (T-AO 201). Source: U.S. Navy photo # 100329-
N-1082Z-140 Djibouti by MC2 Jason R. Zalasky (2010).
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Figure 2. USNS Cesar Chavez (T-AKE-14). Source: U.S. Navy photo # 
190714-N-DX868-1223 Gulf of Tadjoura by HM1 Kenji Shiroma (2019). 
 
Figure 3. USNS Supply (T-AOE 6). Source: U.S. Navy Photo # 
100310N1082Z-050 by MC2 Jason R. Zalasky (2010). 
According to Navy and MSC officials, a greater reliance on distributed 
operations and the lethality provided by a widely distributed fleet will 
require resupplying ships that are farther apart and generally increase the 
demand on the combat logistics force. This stands in contrast to the Navy’s 
traditional concept of operations, in which Navy combatant ships operate in 
task group formations—such as carrier strike groups or amphibious ready 
groups—and to support these formations, combat logistics force ships 
transit with them and replenish them with supplies as needed. (Pendleton, 
2017)  
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The Navy refers to this concept of operations as shuttle ship/station ship (Cribbs, 
2016). Figure 4 represents how the U.S. Navy is currently supported afloat. 
Figure 4. Shuttle vs. Station Ship Concept. Source: Cribbs (2016). 
The changing security environment has created the need to adjust to a more 
distributed concept of operations across the Department of the Navy. The stress this creates 
on the CLF has taken front stage in Department of the Navy and is in large part why the 
NGLS task force has been analyzing different concepts of sustainment to complement the 
CLF. Additionally, as the Marine Corps finalizes its EAB concept of operations in support 
of naval forces inside the WEZ, more sustainment demand will be put on the CLF. As it 
stands, the task force and planners across the Marine Corps believe the platform supply 
vessels, fast supply vessels, and a light amphibious warship are the answer to this problem. 
C. OBJECTIVE
As priorities shift to great power competition and external state actors become more
militarily aggressive, it is paramount that the Navy and Marine Corps logistics 
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communities ready themselves to support worldwide deployment. The goal of our project 
is determining the optimal type and quantity of NGLS to fulfill the ammunition and supply 
demands laid out by the Department of the Navy’s N42 staff. We conduct unbiased 
research in parallel with the NGLS task force to analyze the ship requirements to fulfill the 
future resupply and rearm demands. The task force has provided a family of platforms as 
the solution set for these requirements. Our research assumes that commodities will be 
required ashore and afloat in contested regions. Additionally, CLFs will operate outside 
the WEZ while the NGLS will shuttle supplies into the WEZ to support the SAG and 
EABO.  
We use a notional Indo-Pacific scenario analysis to build an optimization model 







A. OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS IN THE U.S. NAVY
The U.S. Navy has one of the most unique logistics networks in the world. From
underway replenishment (UNREP) of a carrier strike group (CSG) to the detailed 
coordination of prepositioned materiel in support of naval operations stitching across the 
globe, the challenges of supporting such a vast logistical system are formidable. Yet, 
seamlessly, the CLF keeps the operating arm of the Navy from overextending. Whether 
that be in support of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked upon an Amphibious 
Ready Group (ARG) scattered across the map or a humanitarian aid and disaster relief 
(HADR) mission coming to the aid of displaced personnel from a different nation, the CLF 
has demonstrated its flexibility and endurance by meeting the needs of those missions. The 
32nd chief of naval operations, Admiral James Richardson, placed extreme emphasis on 
the logistics capabilities of the U.S. Navy in his 2019 Design for Maintaining Maritime 
Superiority: 
Overextension in the short and long-term pursuit of ends that are beyond 
the ways and means of the force is self-defeating. Over the long timelines 
that characterize the current competition, the navy will be ready to fire 
effectively first, but also be able to defend and return fire. We will aim to 
act as early as possible to de-escalate any crisis on our terms and be ready 
for the next move. This will require that we sustain the fight with the 
logistics capabilities needed to refuel, rearm, resupply, and repair our 
operational forces. (CNO, 2018, p. 6) 
The problem of overextension is a logistics problem, and part of solving that 
problem is ensuring that U.S. Navy and Marine Corps teams grasp and consider the 
uncertainty of facing a peer threat. RAND testimony in 2017 before the Committee on 
Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces concluded that “No 
force is immune to every threat; no force can operate with impunity in a heavily contested 
environment” (Martin, 2017, p. 9). This uncertainty is tied to the A2/AD threat of the 
enemy through surface warfare, sub-surface warfare, long-range weapon systems, and 
mines. Since the Korean War, the U.S. Navy has not employed its amphibious arm into 
harm’s way (Martin, 2017). The nature of amphibious warfare is incredibly involved and 
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requires knowingly placing units into uncertain environments. The establishment and 
sustainment of these amphibious naval forces rests on the logistics elements of the U.S. 
Navy (Martin, 2017). Additionally, their readiness is dependent upon a logistics network 
that is reliable and postured appropriately for DMO and Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operation (EABO) concepts (USN, CNO, 2018, p. 8).  
The U.S. Navy has committed itself to “seek a medium amphibious ship that can 
support the kind of dispersed, agile, constantly relocating force described in the LOCE and 
EABO concepts the USMC has written, as well as the overarching DMO from the navy” 
(Eckstein, 2020, p. 2). The NGLS and light amphibious warship (LAW) will play the role 
as interlocutor between the CLF and the operating forces whether ashore or afloat, 
maneuvering supplies into contested zones. 
B. COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE SUPPORT VESSELS 
The broader commercial market for OSVs drives the development of the platform 
supply vessel (PSV) and fast supply vessel (FSV). The first OSVs began to appear after 
World War II and available vessels consisted of repurposed fishing or military vessels that 
were used to transport personnel, equipment, and supplies to offshore oil wells (Rose, 
2011). The first purpose-built vessel for the offshore industry was named the “Ebb Tide” 
and became the industry standard with its forward bridge and long flat aft (Rose, 2011). 
This vessel and all of its successors until the 1980s were, however, designed for use only 
in water up to 1,000 feet in depth (Rose, 2011). Technological improvements during this 
time coupled with the increasing demand for oil throughout the world contributed to OSV 
development for use in “Deep Water,” classified as anything greater than 1,000 feet in 
depth (Rose, 2011). The drilling capability and technology aboard traditional vessels was 
engineered for shallow waters and became a limitation as increased demand for oil drove 
OSVs into deeper waters (Rose, 2011). In order to safely operate and support the increased 
demand for greater exploration, this newer generation of OSVs was required to be more 
powerful and to have increased cargo capacity. The result was a design that included a 
larger cargo area and optimized under deck spaces with an increased number of bulk liquid 
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tanks. Additionally, these specialized requirements identified the need for purpose-built 
ships to serve a variety of needs (Rose, 2011).  
The PSV is a generic name for a vessel designed primarily to provide logistic 
support to offshore oil or gas platforms. The backbone of the offshore supply chain and 
like the original OSV design, PSVs normally have a large open deck aft for containers and 
large support equipment and internal bulk liquid tanks for fuel, potable water, and dry bulk. 
These vessels generally range in size between 50 meters (165 feet) to 100 meters (330 feet) 
in length and are designed to stay out at sea for up to 7 days (Rose, 2011). Figure 5 depicts 
a typical PSV. 
Figure 5. Platform Supply Vessel. Source: Erikstad and Levander (2012). 
The FSV, more broadly known as a crew boat and classified as a Fast Supply 
Vessel, is like the PSV in capability; however, it differs greatly in capacity and speed. 
Similar to the PSV, the FSV can transport personnel, above deck cargo, and below deck 
bulk liquid and dry cargo. These vessels range in size from 9 to 60 meters (30 to 200 feet) 
and can reach speeds of up to 31 knots while operating near shore (Rose, 2011). Cargo area 
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varies depending on the size of the ship, but some manufacturer’s options include up to 
1,000 barrels of bulk liquid and up 3,000ft3 of dry bulk materials. Passenger capacity ranges 
from 50 to 100 and is limited in duration where overnight accommodations are not usually 
offered (Rose, 2011). Due to their speed and versatility, the FSV has become an essential 
part of the logistics chain for offshore operations. Figure 6 depicts a typical FSV.  
 
Figure 6. Fast Supply Vessel. Source: Breaux Global Technologies (2020). 
C. PRECEDENCE FOR MILITARY USE OF OSVS 
1. BSAH Rhone 
The BSAH Rhone (Figure 7) is the second vessel in a set of four constructed by 
Kership for the French Navy. All these vessel names are derived from the French rivers of 
Loire, Rhone, Seine, and Garonne. They are utilized for rescue missions, environmental 
protection operations, and provide general support for navy units (Naval Today, 2018). At 
230 feet in length, this vessel displaces nearly 2,600 tons, can reach speeds of 14 knots, 
and has the capacity to operate underway for about 30 days before needing to refuel (Naval 
Today, 2018). They are fitted with a 26-foot working boat and an 80-foot, 12-ton crane, 
which enables the transfer of shipping containers. A crew of 17 is required to operate the 
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vessel, and it can accommodate up to 24 passengers. The 2,700-square foot cargo deck 
provides storage for weapons, ammunition, and shipping containers (Naval Today, 2018). 
Figure 7. French Navy Offshore Support Vessel Rhone. 
Source: Naval Today (2018). 
2. HMNZS Manawanui
The New Zealand government purchased a new OSV in 2018 to support dive and 
hydrographic missions, which, at that time, was considered a capability gap for the New 
Zealand Defense Force (NZDF; Royal New Zealand Navy, 2020). The HMNZS 
Manawanui (Figure 8) is a 280-foot vessel built by a Norwegian firm for civilian use, which 
was converted after purchase to fit the needs of the missions it would fulfill for the NZDF. 
One conversion made to this specific vessel is that it was equipped with dive and 
hydrographic systems. The addition of this new OSV served as a replacement of two 
previously decommissioned hydrographic survey and diving support vessels. This new 
OSV will inherit many missions from its predecessors, such as clearing unexploded 
ordnance from World War II, search and recovery, and studying threats in sea lanes. The 
purchase of this new vessel equipped with modern design and systems will provide 
increased capacity, safety, and capabilities over its predecessors. A few of the new 
enhancements include an upgraded crane with a 100-ton capacity, a Remotely Operated 
Vehicle, and a Dynamic Positioning system, which increases effectiveness and safety in a 
wider range of sea conditions (Royal New Zealand Navy, 2020).  
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Figure 8. HMNZS Manawanui. Source: Royal New Zealand Navy (2020). 
3. OSV 401 Al Basra 
Al Basra (Figure 9) is one of two multipurpose OSVs built for the Iraqi Navy in 
collaboration with U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA; Oldham, 2012). This 
steel hull vessel has length of 197 feet and was built by two ship building firms, Gulf Island 
Marine Fabricators in Louisiana and Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine (Oldham, 2012). 
Purposely built to provide a broad range of capabilities, this multipurpose ship will serve 
as a command and control (C2) vessel for smaller patrol boats which provide protection to 
oil platforms. The Al Basra is a vertical replenishment capable platform and is equipped 
with deck-mounted weaponry, which includes Seahawk DS-30, a 30mm remote- operated 
gun mount, and .50-caliber M2 heavy machine guns and six M240 7.62 mm medium 
machine guns (Oldham, 2012). Additionally, this vessel can carry two fast attack boats and 
can fulfill a variety of missions ranging from repair and refueling of patrol boats to 
transportation of troops and firefighting. The Al Basra is part of a larger $86 million OSV 
program that has been serviced by the contracting firm RiverHawk since 2010 (Oldham, 
2012).  
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Figure 9. OSV 401 Al Basra. Source: Oldham (2012). 
D. THE LIGHT AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIP
To support the EABO concept, the commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) has
submitted a request to Congress for a new warship whose main role will be to service the 
expeditionary advance base (EAB) in contested environments. Named the Light 
Amphibious Warship (LAW) this ship will possess the ability to conduct beach landings 
and will be designed to support the establishment and sustainment of EABs. While the 
structure of the forces who will occupy the EAB is still under development, it is generally 
accepted that it will be comprised of multiple reinforced platoons and will be capable of 
conducting and supporting numerous different types of missions such as anti-ship fires, 
aircraft arming and refueling, and reconnaissance to name a few (Snow, 2020) The LAW 
is an integral part of EABO as it will facilitate embarkation, transportation, and landing 
these units. While modest armor and deck- mounted weaponry will be part of most designs, 
the LAW’s survivability is enhanced by its small size and ability to be easily concealed in 
coastal areas and among other ships. Additionally, the LAW will receive support from its 
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supported, land-based Marines via missile fires and U.S. Navy forces (Congressional 
Research Service, 2020).  
While the design of the LAW is still under development , many of the key elements 
have been identified. The new LAW program has been originally presented as a 28- to 
30-ship addition to the current amphibious fleet. The key design elements identified by the 
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will result in a vessel measuring from 200 to 400 feet and 
crewed by 40 personnel (Congressional Research Service, 2020). The ship will be able to 
transport 75 Marines at a minimum and have the cargo capacity to transport up 8,000 square 
feet of weapons, supplies, and equipment. The defensive weaponry organic to the LAW 
will come from a 25mm or 30mm gun system and multiple .50 caliber machine guns 
(Congressional Research Service, 2020). The minimum speed and range requested were 
14 knots and 3,500 nautical miles, respectively. Lastly, the LAW differs from many of its 
close relatives in the beach- able family of ships in that it will be designed either to operate 
as an addition to a fleet group or to deploy independently. Figure 10 depicts an artist’s 
rendering; however, the actual design could differ from this (Congressional Research 
Service, 2020). 
 
Figure 10. Light Amphibious Warship. Source: Trevithick (2020). 
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III. SCOPE, DATA SOURCES, AND MODEL
A. SCOPE
The scope of our research is through the lens of the logistic parameters of rearm
and resupply. Our project does not include refuel demand requirements, as another Naval 
Postgraduate School student group is conducting parallel research for that vector (Loseke 
& Yarnell, 2020). Research for our project focuses on three types of vessels: platform 
supply vessel (PSV), fast supply vessel (FSV), and LAW. A major assumption is that the 
CLF will be able to sustain all the demands within the scenario. Lastly, the scope focuses 
on type and quantity of ships regardless of cost. 
Our project is sponsored by the deputy chief of naval operations, installations and 
logistics OPNAV N4. After discussions with the Strategic Mobility and Combat Logistics 
Division’s (N42) staff, they are specifically concerned that our research and analysis yield 
the type and quantity of ships they should purchase to fulfill future demand requirements 
based on new operating concepts. The data analysis for this research will include the 
capabilities and limitations set by the N42’s top level requirements (TLR) for the PSV, 
FSV, and LAW. This data was then applied to a fictional, realistic wartime scenario that 
was approved by the sponsor to ascertain the quantities and types of ships needed to sustain 
the force in the scenario environment. Lastly, our project includes a classified report that 
analyzes a classified scenario provided by the N42 to provide type and quantity of ships 
required to fulfill potential demand requirements.  
B. DATA SOURCES
1. Vessel TLR Analysis
We analyzed the objective and threshold requirements of PSV, FSV, and LAW. 
The NGLS task force provided us the TLRs for each vessel. Our methodology utilizes 
various TLRs to derive capacity and throughput constraints. Tables 1 through 6 depict the 
TLRs of each vessel that impacts our method.  
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Table 1. Interim TLR for the Intra-Theater Small Auxiliary Logistics 
Platform: PSV, Vessel Characteristics Source: OPNAV N4 (2019). 
 
 
Table 2. Interim TLR for the Intra-Theater Small Auxiliary Logistics 
Platform: PSV, Replenishment of Afloat Units, Source: OPNAV N4 (2019). 
Number Characteristic Threshold Objective 
TLR-102 Capable of transferring 
pallets of supplies/ammo to 
afloat units while 
underway at sea 
15 loads/hour in series 
with refueling 
25 loads/hour 
TLR-104 Capable of transferring 
missiles 







Number Characteristic Threshold Objective 
TLR-009 Capable of independent 
operations 
Meet statement Objective (O) 
=Threshold (T) 
TLR-012 Receive dry cargo, 
ammunition, and fuel 
Must be capable of 
replenishing cargo, 
ammunition, and fuel at sea 
from U.S. Navy CLF 
O=T 
TLR-013 Deck area/cargo capacity 
(payload area) for point 
to point movement and 
not reload 
500 short tons 
8,000 square feet 




Table 3. Interim TLR for the Intra-Theater Small Auxiliary Logistics 
Platform: FSV, Vessel Characteristics Source: OPNAV N4 (2019) 
Number Characteristic Threshold Objective 
TLR-008 Capable of independent 
operations 
Meet statement O=T 
TLR-011 Receive dry cargo, 
ammunition, and fuel 
Must be capable of 
replenishing cargo, 
ammunition, and fuel in the 
littorals from PSV and SLV 
At sea from 
U.S. Navy 
CLF 
TLR-012 Deck area/cargo capacity 
(payload area) for point to 
point movement and not 
reload 
2,000 square feet 3,000 square 
feet 
TLR-014 Potable water transfer 
ashore 
11,000 gallons with 2,000 ft 
hose reel 
O=T 






Table 4. Interim TLR for the Intra-Theater Small Auxiliary Logistics 
Platform: FSV, Replenishment of EAB, Source: OPNAV N4 (2019). 
Number Characteristic Threshold Objective 
TLR-101 Capable of delivering fuel 
to ashore units/facility 
500 gpm with 2,000 ft hose 
reel 
1,000 gpm 
with 2,000 ft 
hose reel 
TLR-104 Capable of transferring 
cargo to a pier or ashore 
Organic lift capability to 
transfer ISU 90 
O=T 
Table 5. Draft LAW TLR Justification Matrix (v 2.0), Intermodal Cargo 
Transfer and Transport (030 Series), Source: N9 DCNO for  
Warfare Systems (2020). 
Number Characteristic Threshold Objective 
TLR-140 Cargo area 8,000 sqft 12,000 sqft 
TLR-141 Deck loading 450 lb/sqft 500 lb/sqft 
Table 6. Draft LAW TLR Justification Matrix (v 2.0), Beach-Ability (010 
Series). Source: N9 DCNO for Warfare Systems (2020). 
Number Characteristic Threshold Objective 
TLR-210 On/Off Load Time 
*Not evaluated during
LAW RET
90 Min 45 Min 
2. Scenario Descriptions
The following scenario provided the framework for our research analysis. The 
situation is generally based on U.S. Naval Forces conducting DMO in the vicinity of 
Celebes Sea along the First Island Chain. Tensions are high with China over the recent 
Chinese occupation of the islands of Palawan, Philippines, and Natuna Besar, Indonesia. 
U.S. naval forces have recently been involved in a small engagement with Chinese naval 
combatants and have inserted a Marine EAB to support naval operations.  
The force laydown of our model was based on the architecture depicted in Figure 
11. The battlespace is broken up into two zones named the contested zone or WEZ and 
controlled zone. The WEZ is the portion of the battlespace where enemy templated 
weapons have a high probability of engaging friendly forces. The major nodes consisted of 
the CLF, SAG, EAB, and transshipment point. The primary source of supply services seven 
demand points via shuttle ships. This source of supply was represented by a CLF, which
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included standard Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Ships. For the purposes of the 
scenario, we have assumed that the CLF is capable of providing adequate supplies to 
support all regional demands. The demand points in this scenario were derived from two 
primary force locations, one afloat and one ashore. The ashore unit represents an EAB, 
which is a small contingency of land forces positioned at three different geographical 
locations. The EABs are identified in our scenario as anti-surface warfare (ASuW), forward 
arming and refueling point (FARP), and logistics. These represent three unique types of 
EABs that have different rearm and resupply requirements. The afloat unit representative 
of SAG consists of three guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and one guided-missile frigates 
(FFG), all which are tactically dispersed throughout the area of operations. The shuttle 
ships transport supplies from the CLF to either the SAG or a transshipment transfer node 
for follow-on transport to the demand points ashore. 
 





In our desire to seek out the minimal number of vessels required to meet the 
demands of the Navy’s distributed maritime operational architecture, we utilized linear 
programming (LP) to achieve the lion’s share of our analysis. We used an optimization 
model to find solutions for various scenarios. Microsoft Office Excel was our primary tool 
for executing the models and enabled us to manipulate spreadsheets through a series of 
mathematical formulas in such a way that it produced visual data that aided our analysis. 
With this tool, we were also able to visually understand the impacts on our model if certain 
constraints were relaxed or conversely, when they were further tightened.  
Our project cultivates optimization models that will estimate the quantity and type 
of naval logistics platforms that would be utilized to support the distributed maritime 
operations of the U.S. Navy—specifically in support of EABs and SAGs. Variability is 
introduced into the model by adjusting varying demands and throughput capacities.  
In the following paragraphs, we extrapolate on all of the major features of our 
model that aided our analysis, findings, and results. Our model began as a standard 
optimization model where we attempted to minimize the number of vessels required to 
complete a resupply under a given condition. Over time, we bifurcated the model to 
represent two different sides of the scenario—this dividing line was where a PSV (loaded 
with supplies from the CLF) conducted an UNREP with a LAW (preparing to resupply an 
EAB node). However, we identified this UNREP location as a transshipment node, and 
inserted it as such into the model, effectively changing the nature of our model to solve a 




2. Model Component 
a. Decision Variables 
i. The vessels were designated by letter and number where k signified a vessel 
and number 1= PSV, 2 = FSV, and 3 = LAW. 
ii. The different demand and supply nodes were identified by i and the number 
1= CLF, 2 = SAG, and 3 = Transshipment. 
iii. The specific demand location was labeled j and the numbers 2–1 = DDG1, 
2–2 = DDG2, 2–3 = DDG3, 2–4 = LCS, 3 = Transshipment, 4 = ASuW, 5 = FARP, and 6 
= LOG. 
Example #1: Ykij = number of deliveries by vessels of type k (=1 for PSV, 2 for 
FSV, and 3 for LAW) from node i (=1 for CLF) to j (=2-1...4, DDG-1,2,3 and LCS2- 4, 
Trans =3 ) and from i (=3 for Trans) to j (-4,5,6 for ASuw, FARP, and LOG) 
Example #2: Xkij = flow on vessel k from node i to j (k, i, j defined as above) 
b. Objective Function  
Our optimization model took the above variables and sought to minimize the 
number of vessels required to support the scenario. To do this, we assigned vessels with 
particular routes within the scenario resulting in an optimal quantity of deliveries. The 
demand fulfilled by these deliveries will feed into the optimal number and type of vessels 
necessary to meet all requirements.  
The demand signals that drive our model are derived from a classified United States 
Marine Corps and United States Navy scenario and the model incorporates those demands 
based on different conditions. These figures were then modified from the classified 
scenario for inclusion in this report. The mathematical representation of the objective 
function is as follows:          
Min=Y112-1+Y112-2+Y112-3+Y112-4+Y113+Y234+Y235+Y236+Y334+Y335+Y336 
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c. Constraints  
With the variables and optimization function clearly identified, we then applied 
constraints derived from demand requirements, supplies of the nodes, capabilities, and 
capacities of the vessels. These inputs are from different scenarios, which induce 
variability. The architecture of the model was designed as such to conform to different 
scenarios by changing the various capabilities, capacities, and constraints of the model 
dictated by the vessels themselves. We incorporate capacity constraints as well as time 
constraints for naval shipping assets and naval logistics operations. We then consider the 
capabilities of each vessel, deck space available, bulk fluid carriage space, transfer time, 
and beach or port accessibility. Our constraints are as follows: 
i. Supply: 
CLF (1): X112-1+X112-2+X112-3+X112-4+X113 ≤ SF1  
At Transshipment (3): X234+X235+X236+X334+X335+X336 ≤ ST3 
ii. Demands: 
DDG (2-1): Xf112-1 ≥ DF2-1  
DDG (2-2): Xf112-2 ≥ DF2-2  
DDG (2-3): Xf112-3 ≥ DF2-3  
LCS (2-4): Xf112-4 ≥ DF2-4  
To Transshipment (3): Xf113 ≥ DF3  
ASuW (4): Xf234+Xf334 ≥ DF4  
FARP (5): Xf235+Xf335 ≥ DF5 
LOG (6): Xf236+Xf336 ≥ DF6 





cf112-1: Y112-1-Xf112-1 ≥ 0 
cf112-2: Y112-2-Xf112-2 ≥ 0 
cf112-3: Y112-3-Xf112-3 ≥ 0 
cf112-4: Y112-4-Xf112-4 ≥ 0 
cf113: Y113-Xf113 ≥ 0 
cf234: Y234-Xf234 ≥ 0 
cf235: Y235-Xf235 ≥ 0 
cf236: Y236-Xf236 ≥0 
cf334: Y334-Xf334 ≥ 0 
cf335: Y335-Xf335 ≥ 0 
cf336: Y336-Xf336 ≥ 0 
X’s ≥ 0, Y’s integer 
d. OPTIMIZATION
Our goal throughout our entire course of study and analysis has been to achieve the 
optimal solution for the U.S. Navy given a certain set of constraints. Utilizing a series of 
constraints, we have been able to produce a workable and flexible model that will provide 
an understanding of what the resupply of an EAB and a SAG will look like given certain 
inputs. “What is the optimal mix of NGLSs required for a given scenario” is the principal 
question.  
e. OUTPUTS
The alternatives in our model are as follows: 
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- Quantity of deliveries by PSV, given a specific route 
- Quantity of deliveries by FSV, given a specific route 
- Quantity of deliveries by LAW, given a specific route 
- Number of pallets of ammunition and supplies shipped via PSV 
- Number of pallets of ammunition and supplies shipped via FSV 
- Number of pallets of ammunition and supplies shipped via LAW 
This thesis analyzes the appropriate mix of these vessels given the limitations and 
capabilities of each vessel and the battlespace constraints.  
f. UNITS OF MEASURE  
The ship capabilities are a portion of our model that govern the objective function. 
In order to best communicate the results and justification for our analysis we utilized a 
standard warehouse pallet (pallet) as our unit of measure, 48 × 40 inches (MCRP 4–11.3G, 
p. 4–1). Based on the square footage available on the deck of a given vessel, we were able 
to discern its capacity in terms of pallets. Our justification for converting our units to a 
pallet were driven by how demand is articulated by the EAB and the SAG (“we require 
delivery of 1 pallet of MREs every day” versus “we require delivery of 13.33 square feet 
of MREs every day”). This conversion to a simple embarkation language also enables the 
universal use of this model for various other applications with other platforms whether that 
be aerial, overland trucking, or rail.  
We recognized that some ammunition would not be able to be strapped to a pallet, 
but rather pre-loaded on a vehicle, such as a M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
(HIMARS). For those specific requirements we translated the square footage of a required 
vehicle to pallets as well, thus continuing the use of a standard unit of measure and 
embarkation language.  
 
Some capabilities that we did not take into account in our analysis include 
- On-board defensive capabilities 
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- Ship speed given sea states and operational environment
- Crew endurance (Merchant Marines)
While they were not covered over the course of our review, we highly recommend 
those topics for future study.  
g. BATTLESPACE CONSTRAINTS
Some battlespace constraints inherent to our model were induced either by our 
sponsors or scenario-induced in order to isolate the optimization model. Some of those 
battlespace constraints are as follows: 
a. Time to transfer
b. Payload constraints
c. Transshipment constraints
- The LAW remains within the WEZ and is solely resupplied by the PSV
(sponsor induced) 
- The EAB is broken out into three geographically separate nodes (scenario
induced) 
- The SAG will not consolidate into one location for resupply but will
maintain its tactical posture (sponsor induced). 
26 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
27 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The culmination of our research was to find the optimal number of PSVs, FSVs, 
and LAWs given a hypothetical scenario. Ultimately, that led us to achieving a secondary 
objective of minimizing the number of deliveries by NGLS.  
The tables listed in this portion of the report indicate the supply and demand 
attributed to the nodes of the network. Those nodes can be changed, added to, or subtracted 
from in order to adapt to specific scenario driven requirements, indicated in Figure 11. This 
illustrates the flexible structure of this model.  
A. SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND CAPACITIES COMPARISONS
The capacities in our research are reflective of either the top-level requirements
and/or recommendations from subject matter experts (SME), both of which were provided 
by the sponsor. Table 7 lists all locations within the scenario and altered amounts of 
palletized supplies and ammunition at each location. The capacity for the CLF is set to 
100,000 units which represents a hypothetical quantity which is unlikely to be depleted by 
the supported force. This allows us to isolate sponsor’s problem by eliminating the need to 
evaluate supply availability prior to this (CLF) point. Additionally, this approach was 
recommended by SMEs early on in the research in order to limit this project’s scope. The 
supply and demand at the transshipment node are equal to one another as a result of this 
location only being a supply transfer point. A point where vessels originating from the CLF 
transfer cargo to the vessels identified to supply the end user of the supplies. Demands for 
the SAG, ASuW, FARP, and LOG are from specific scenario-driven data; however, these 
can be changed if the scenario is altered to meet future plans. Additionally, task 
organization of the EAB is still under refinement and therefore, the demand requirements 
will likely change once manning requirements are clearly defined in doctrine. Finally, the 
quantities in the capacity column were derived from the total area of storage space on each 
vessel with the exception of the vessel capacities from the CLF to the SAG. These 
capacities represent the transfer capacity of each vessel (30 pallets per hour) and places the 
sponsor-induced constraint of no more than 2 hours per SAG vessel resupply event.  
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Table 7. Supply, Demand, and Capacities: Ammunition and Supplies. 
Source: Apte et al. (2020). 
Ammunition and Supplied in Pallets Supply/Demand 
A-S Supply at CLF 1  100000 
A-S Supply at Trans 3 750 
A-S Demand at SAG 2 100 
A-S Demand at Trans 3  750 
A-S Demand at ASuW 4 50 
A-S Demand at FARP 5 350 
A-S Demand at LOG 6  350 
Ammunition and Supplied in Pallets Capacity 
PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 60 
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 800 
PSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 800 
PSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 800 
PSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 800 
FSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 60 
FSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 250 
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 250 
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 250 
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 250 
LAW from CLF 1 to SAG 2 60 
LAW from CLF 1 to Trans 3 1000 
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1000 
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1000 




B. MINIMUM NUMBER OF DELIVERIES FOR TRANSPORTATION
By applying the information, we collected capacity and demand characteristics for
each location, node, and vessel. The model then provides us with the optimal solution by 
providing the number of deliveries per vessel class. These deliveries can be interpreted in 
a few different ways to suit the planners needs. In one way, the number of deliveries simply 
equates to the number of vessels needed to accomplish the mission. The result of this 
interpretation requires more vessels to fulfill demands and inherently adds flexibility within 
the logistics network. Another interpretation would use the same ship to service multiple 
locations, which results in fewer total ships, less flexibility in the logistics support system, 
and longer lead times. Additionally, while not the focus of this research, this second 
interpretation presents more mission risk due to the impact the loss of one ship would have 
on the support system. Table 8 depicts the model results when the SAG is comprised of 
three DDGs and one LCS, and Table 9 shows the model results when the SAG contains 
three DDGs and one FFG. After making this change, we observed the same total number 
of vessels; however, the required vessel types have changed between Table 8 and Table 9. 
This small demonstration is used to show how this model can accommodate a change in 
the SAG composition and perhaps a change in the mission overall. 
Table 8. Number of Deliveries with LCS. Source: Apte et al. (2020). 
Ammunition and Supplies Deliveries 
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2–1 1 
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2–2 1 
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2–3 1 
PSV from CLF 1 to LCS 2–4 1 
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 1 
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 0 
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 
Total 8 
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Table 9. Number of Deliveries with FFG. Source: Apte et al. (2020). 
Ammunition and Supplies Deliveries 
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2–1 1 
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2–2 1 
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2–3 1 
PSV from CLF 1 to FFG 2–4 1 
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 1 
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 0 
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 
Total  8 
 
 
C. DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMBINED AND 
SPLIT SCENARIOS 
An additional feature that was added to our analysis was the bifurcation of the 
network in order to better understand the amount of deliveries required for two specific 
portions of our scenario. Articulated in Table 10, we titled the divided transportation 
networks “Split 1” and “Split 2.” Split 1 represented the portion of the model from the CLF 
ship to the transshipment node, this split included deliveries to the SAG. Split 2 represented 
the transportation network of the model from the transshipment node to ASuW, FARP, and 
Logistics.  
The advantage of dividing the network as such was to observe the amount of 
deliveries that would be required for each transportation network. Ultimately, it resulted in 
three deliveries for each transportation network—which seems inconsequential as the 
combined transshipment model produced six deliveries. However, the outcomes of each 
split transportation model produced varying amounts of deliveries utilizing different 
vessels. This provided significant information regarding the utility of each vessel and aided 
our conclusions.  
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The practical advantage of dissecting the network into two distinct parts is seen by 
the logistics planner. Split 1 mainly consists of a USN demand architecture where the 
customers are those ships than make up the SAG. Split 2 mainly consists of a USMC 
demand architecture where the customers are those EAB nodes, however they may be 
composed. 
Table 10. Scenarios: Split Network. Source: Apte et al. (2020). 
Scenarios  Combined Split 1 Split 2 
Ammunition and Supplies in 
Pallets Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries 
PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 2 2   
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 1 1   
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1   0 
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0   0 
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 0   0 
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0   1 
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1   1 
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1   1 
Total 6 3 3 
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This project has given us an appreciation for the wicked problems presented by 
providing naval logistics inside an adversary’s Weapon Engagement Zone (WEZ). Our 
task was to determine the optimal type and quantity of NGLS to fulfill the ammunition and 
supply demands laid out by the Department of the Navy’s N42 staff. Since the cost was 
outside of the scope of this project, we did not model an objective to minimizing cost. 
Additionally, the sponsor did not provide any deadlines to resupply demand afloat and 
ashore due to the unpredictable nature of this problem. Thus, we found measuring the 
number of deliveries was an appropriate way to determine the mix of NGLS vessels 
without addressing the cost and time constraints. We also thought it might be worth finding 
how long the transportation time would take for these deliveries (only the transportation 
time, not the unload/load times). Therefore, we took some notional distances and speeds 
(based on top-level requirements) and showed the minimum time required if only a PSV 
(and FSV and LAW) makes all the deliveries on the specific route. This was done to 
support N42 future planning and as a demonstration of how to translate number of 
deliveries to address questions of the timeliness of those deliveries. Our main objective 
was to minimize the number of deliveries.  
With the expertise and support of our advisors, we used a notional scenario to 
develop the transshipment network that we could mathematically model. A delivery is 
defined as carrying the commodities from a supply node to a demand node, on the given 
route by the vessel designed to travel on that route. We assumed that replenishment in the 
transshipment network is done sequentially. So, we created two separate transportation 
networks within the transshipment network. This created two advantages: first, the split 
transportation networks can operate in parallel, thus reducing the total time; second, by 
creating the splits, planners or decision-makers can better delineate the afloat and ashore 
demand requirements. Our model provides the planner or decision-maker the flexibility to 
determine whether 10 deliveries are made by 10 vessels or five vessels making two trips.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our research led us to a couple of recommendations. We recommend that the time 
constraint for the PSV engaging the SAG inside the WEZ should be investigated. This was 
the binding constraint in our model, which informed our ship capacity. For example, a PSV 
has the capacity to carry 800 pallets, but since time to engage the SAG in the WEZ was 
constraining, we set the ship capacity to what the transfer rate of the ship was, given the 
amount of time permitted. The sponsor should analyze the possibility of increasing the 
transfer rate within the top-level requirements or increasing the time that vessels can 
engage the SAG inside the WEZ.  
Based on Table 11 and our analysis, the acquisition of the LAW is favored over the 
FSV. In all the scenarios, the most FSVs needed to transport ammunition and supplies is 
one compared to three LAWs. This provides the sponsor with the opportunity to reduce 
cost of maintaining an addition platform within the NGLS portfolio. Although the FSV is 
not favored in our model, it does not mean that this vessel does not have a place in the 
future fight. 





Scenario Based on Subject Matter 
Expert Feedback (Figure 6-1 and 6-2)
1.1 Combined
1.2 Split 1 and Split 2
2
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 
3 DDGs and LCS with Sustainment 
(Figure 7-1)
3
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 
3 DDGs and FFG with Sustainment 
(Figure 7-2)
4




4.3 Three SAGs and Two ASuWs 0 5 0 3
0 5 0 3
1 4 0 3
2 3 0 3
2 4 0 3
2 3 1 2
1 3 1 2
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